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GENETICALLY-INFLUENCED ANTISOCIAL CONDUCT
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR*
[I]f, in the course of further development in genetic science and
technology, the law-either judicial decision making or the legislative
process-is invoked, it will very likely reflect contemporary mores.
What concerns some people, myself included, is the good possibility that
because the rate of discovery of new scientific knowledge exceeds the
rate of adaptability of this knowledge on the part of our social and legal
institutions, we are today running the risk that, as with nuclear fission,
we shall have the knowledge of the means of radically changing the
traditional nature of man or his institutions without a concomitant
development of our social sciences and of our competence to control the
use of this new knowledge for humane purposes.'
I. INTRODUCTION
IN THE LATTER PART OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, the Italian physician
Cesare Lombroso developed a theory that a "criminal type" could be
identified by such physical characteristics as excessive hair, long
earlobes, large jaw and slanting forehead These characteristics in-
dicated a biological reversion in the individual to primitive stages of
human evolution, and were attended by primitive levels of response to
the environment. Thus, according to Lombroso's theory, such an inferior
"throwback" would have a biological predisposition to commit criminal
acts.
A half-century later, in the late 1930's, the American anthropologist
E.A. Hooton conducted extensive studies involving 14,000 men in-
carcerated in state prisons.' After taking numerous measurements and
comparing them to those he had taken of 3,000 men without criminal
records, he also concluded that the primary cause of crime was "biological
inferiority."
Today, of course, such attitudes of absolute genetic determinism have
been widely rejected and even ridiculed by both the scientific and legal
communities.' The reaction in recent years to such attitudes toward
genetic determination and the undemocratic concept of biological in-
* Associate Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law. A.B., University
of California at Berkeley; J.D., U.C.L.A. School of Law.
1 Krever, Some Legal Implications of Advances in Human Genetics, 17 CAN.
J. GENET. CYTOL. 283 (1975).
2 G. LOMBROSO-FERRERO, CRIMINAL MAN ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFICATION
OF CESARE LOMBROSO (1911).
E. HOOTON, THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY (1939).
See, e.g., H. BARNES & N. TEETER, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY (3d ed.
1959).
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feriority - with the inevitably attendant shadow of racism always
present- has caused a violent and anti-biological bias among both scien-
tists and those in the criminal justice system. Partly because of the ob-
vious excesses of Lombroso, Hooton and others, medical and social
scientists have swung to the other extreme of the spectrum, almost
universally adopting a strict environmental theory of crime: Criminal
conduct is purely the result of the totality of social factors operating on
an individual from early childhood on into the adult stages. The
prevalent contemporary view among scientists, criminologists, politi-
cians and members of the legal community is that criminal conduct has
little or no basis in biology, but is almost exclusively the result of en-
vironmental factors; the criminal is simply the product of his society. As
a noted commentator expressed the prevailing view, "[tihere is not the
slightest evidence to believe that anyone ever inherits a tendency to
commit criminal acts; crime is a social condition, not a biological condi-
tion."5
Relatively recent developments in the field of genetics, however, are
beginning to indicate that this all-or-nothing attitude may be incorrect;
behavior may be the result of a roughly equal combination of heredity
and environment. Extensive empirical studies of identical twins
separated at birth and raised under diverse conditions, for example,
reveal startlingly parallel behavioral patterns in later life, to the point
of such remote characteristics as having identical tastes in clothing and
cars, identical political views, and even giving their children identical
names.
Perhaps the most interesting genetically-oriented studies involve the
so-called "XYY syndrome," wherein chromosomal aberrations have been
theorized as effecting behavioral patterns to the point of contributing
to, or even determining, criminal conduct. The XYY studies test for
variations in the number and/or sexual characteristics of the
chromosomes. Every person normally carries forty-six chromosomes in
every cell of his body, arranged in twenty-three pairs. Of these twenty-
three pairs, twenty-two are "autosomes," or genes, which contain most
of the individual's biological characteristics (e.g., color of hair, height,
nose shape, etc.). The remaining pair of genes are "gonosomes" which
determine such remaining traits as primary sexual characteristics. In
women, these paired sex chromosomes are called "X" chromosomes; in
men, the gonosomes are represented by one of the X chromosomes
paired with a much smaller "Y" chromosome. These are referred to by
geneticists as the XX and the XY gonosomes respectively, and their
presence in a fetus determines, among other things, whether the child
will be a male or a female.
5 Ashley-Montague, A Biologist Looks at Crime, 217 ANNALS 46 (1941).
P. MOODY, GENETICS OF MAN (1967).
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On a rare occasion, however, the process of fertilization by the male
sperm of the female ovum misfunctions and a fetus is created which con-
tains chromosomal abnormalities. If an extra twenty-first chromosome
is present, for example, a mental and physical defect known as Down's
Syndrome (Mongolism) results. Similarly, if the gonosomes or "sex
chromosomes" are altered in number or in their characteristics, certain
fairly predictable results will take place. Thus, where an extra "X"
chromosome is added to a female XX pair, the result is the XXX or so-
called "super female" syndrome; such women will appear physically nor-
mal, but will be mentally retarded.
The studies relevant to this discussion involve aberrations in the male
XY gonosomes. These abnormalities can occur in a number of ways. If
an extra X chromosome occurs, an XXY male is created; this has been
dubbed the Klinefelter Syndrome. Such an individual will be mildly
retarded, have some breast enlargement and will be sterile. The
Klinefelter Syndrome occurs approximately once in every 400 male births,
and there are indications that besides the obvious defects there also
may be present such antisocial behavioral patterns as alchoholism and
homosexuality.
Similarly, if the male gonosomes receive an additional Y chromosome
(ie., an extra "male" chromosome) the XYY or so-called "super male" is
created. Such individuals apparently tend to be much taller than
average, and often have an acne condition of the skin. Statistically, it is
believed that a "super male" occurs approximately once in every 1000
male births.' Recent studies seem to indicate that such individuals tend
to be more aggressive than most, and an unusually high precentage of
criminal conduct has been observed. Perhaps the most well-known
modern carrier of the XYY deviation was Richard Speck, convicted of
murdering eight nurses in Chicago in 1966.1
Just exactly how often antisocial conduct occurs in the XYY male has
been the subject of numerous genetic studies. These studies and their
conclusions have stirred up more than a little controversy and heated
debate among physical and social scientists. If there is a correlation be-
tween the XYY defect and criminal conduct then the prevailing theories
of environmentalism are wrong, and antisocial conduct may be
genetically determined or at least influenced. If that is true, entire
premises which lay at the foundation of the criminal justice system may
be faulty.
The "super male" phenomenon was apparently first reported, and the
controversy first arose, in Scotland in 1966. Scientists there conducted a
study of all 342 inmates at the maximum security state hospital at
Brown, Sex Chromosomes and the Law, 2 LANCET 508 (1962).
8 Brown, Chromosomes and Crime, 40 NEW SCIENTIST 235 (Oct. 1968).
Telfer, Are Some Criminals Born That Way?, 34 THINK 24, 26 (Nov.-Dec.
1968) [hereinafter cited as Telfer].
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Carstairs. ° Of these 342 inmates, 249 had been committed by the court
system; all but ten of the 342 had criminal records involving violent con-
duct. Assuming the XYY incidence rate of .1% (1 in 1,000), the research-
ers could expect to find none or possible one in the entire inmate
population. Instead, they found nine carriers of the XYY defect-an in-
cidence rate of approximately 3%, or thirty times what could statistical-
ly be expected.
In the following year, another group of researchers conducted a study
of similar maximum security institutions at Rampton and Moss Side in
England.11 In this study of mentally subnormal men, detained because of
antisocial behavior, only inmates over six feet tall were "karyotyped" or
checked for genetic aberration. Fifty such men were found. Amazingly,
twelve of these men were discovered to be so-called "super males"-an
incidence rate of 24%, or 240 times greater than would statistically be
expected.
The next significant study took place in 1968 in the United States.
12
Again, scientists studied inmates at four criminal institutions, this time
karyotyping only those males over five feet, eleven inches in height.
The results continued to indicate that an unusually high proportion of
such individuals had histories of violent behavior. At one of the institu-
tions, a mental hospital for the criminally insane, four of the fifty in-
mates examined had the XXY deviation (Klinefelter Syndrome), and two
had the XYY ("super male")-an overall incidence of one in eight.
In the same year, researchers in Australia conducted a study of
thirty-four inmates at a Melbourne prison.13 Four of these persons were
found to be XYY deviants, giving an incidence rate approximately 125
times what would normally be expected. Interestingly, of the four de-
viants, one was a convicted murderer, one had been charged with
murder but found unfit to enter a plea, one was convicted of attempted
murder, and only the fourth-a thief-had been convicted of an offense
not involving at least the attempt to commit murder.
Scientists in Denmark were the next to test this strange
phenomenon." Researchers there karyotyped inmates over 180 cen-
timeters (approximately five feet, eleven inches) in height at a state
hospital over a period of one-and-a-half years. Of twenty-three inmates
who were studied, three were discovered to be carrying the XYY devia-
tion, representing an incidence rate of 13% for men over 180 cen-
10 Jacobs, Aggressive Behavior, Mental Subnormality and the XYY Male, 208
NATURE 1351 (1965).
11 Casy, YY Chromosomes and Antisocial Behavior, 2 LANCET 859 (1966).
11 Telfer, Incidence of Gross Chromosomal Errors Among Tall Criminal
American Males, 159 SCIENCE 1249 (1968).
13 Wiener, XYY Males in a Melbourne Prison, 1 LANCET 150 (1968).
14 Neilson, The XYY Syndrome in a Mental Hospital, 8 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
186 (1970).
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timeters and of .25% of the entire population of the hospital surveyed
during the year-and-a-half (1180 patients); even the .25/o figure is two-
and-a-half times higher than should be expected. Of the three XYY men,
all had criminal records and all displayed aggressive character traits. In-
terestingly, none of the three had any history of criminality in their
families; all had been raised in normal households.
In 1970, scientists in Australia conducted a karyotypic survey of in-
mates at a maximum security ward for mentally ill males. 5 Of fifty-five
in the ward, three had gonosomal aberrations -again indicating an in-
cidence rate vastly higher than should occur by chance alone. Likewise,
in 1977, researchers surveyed eighteen hospitals for the mentally han-
dicapped in England for chromosomal aberration." They found that the
highest incidence (1.3%) was found in the hospital which had the highest
proportion of patients with behavioral disorders. After studying the
XYY men, the English researchers concluded that these men were con-
sidered the "black sheep" of their families relatively early in their lives,
that they showed little forethought, acted impulsively and exhibited a
marked tendency to engage in "abnormal or unusual" behavior begin!i-
ing in the teenage years or earlier.
Additional studies have been conducted, some reenforcing the men-
tioned findings, others -predominantly American- tending to discount
the phenomenon or interpret the results in nonhereditary terms. Can
the findings be explained in a way acceptable to the environmentalist?
This was attempted in the original study of the Scottish inmates (the so-
called "Carstairs study"). Batteries of psychological tests were given
the XYY aberrants, but surprisingly there appeared to be no significant
differences between that group and a control group of randomly
selected inmates. No significant physical differences were noted, other
than the obvious high incidence of height among XYY males. A number
of findings, however, tended to directly refute the environmentalists'
argument that family or social factors were the basis for the antisocial
conduct of the XYY aberrants. First, unlike the general institutional
population, the XYY inmates were found to have no significant family
history of mental illness or crime; of nine XYY subjects investigated, only
one had an immediate family member who had been convicted, and that
member had been convicted only once. By contrast, of eighteen control
subjects at Carstairs, there were 139 convictions recorded in the im-
mediate families. Second, the XYY inmates had histories of crime much
earlier in their lives than did the control group. Three of the nine XYY
men had been convicted before reaching ten years of age, and the
1" Sutherland & Bartholomew, Chromosome Survey in a Security Ward. Total
Ascertainment, 3 AUST. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1970).
16 Hunter, XYY Males: Some Clinical and Psychiatric Aspects Deriving from
a Survey of 1811 Males in Hospitals for the Mentally Handicapped, 131 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 468 (1977).
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group's mean age for the first conviction was 13.1. None of the randomly
selected control group had been convicted before ten years of age, and
their mean age for first conviction was eighteen. Third, it appeared
from comparative studies that the XYY inmates were considerably
more resistant to rehabilitation than were other inmates.
The inference of these studies are, of course, disturbing. That there
appears to be a genetic "type" which is inherently disposed to criminal
conduct appears to be a distinct possibility. In 1964, before the XYY
studies, the well-known and controversial English psychologist H.J.
Eysenck had gone so far as to argue that Lombroso was not wrong after
all, and that there may be individuals who are truly "born criminals"
due to the existence of a gene, chromosome, or other structure causing
physiological or neurological differences between the criminal and non-
criminal individual. 7 Later, after conducting her own studies, Dr. Mary
Telfer of the Elwyn Institute in Philadelphia concluded that the results
were sufficiently definite to define an "XYY syndrome," with the symp-
toms described as "extremely tall stature, long limbs, with strikingly
long arm span, facial acne, mild mental retardation, severe mental ill-
ness (including psychosis) and aggressive, antisocial behavior involving
a long history of arrests, frequently beginning at an early age.""
The arguments between the geneticists and the sociologists will con-
tinue. It does appear that there is strong and continually emerging
evidence that genetic factors are at least influential in determining an
individual's conduct throughout his life. As science is able to dig even
deeper into the mysterious mini-universe of DNA, further disturbing
discoveries as to genetically-influenced behavior will inevitably emerge.
It would appear that the results of continuing genetic research are in-
creasingly pointing to a disturbing conclusion: Much of our conduct is
determined to varying degrees by genetic factors. Much to the delight
of the philosophical "determinists," our lives are programmed to a con-
siderable extent long before we are even brought into this world. As
unsettling as these scientific discoveries are, however, the issues posed
to our system of criminal justice are even more ominous. Once the con-
cept of genetic determination is accepted and applied to antisocial con-
duct, a number of questions present themselves to our system of
criminal justice for resolution-questions which cannot be ignored.
First, how should society deal with the offender whose crime was at
least genetically influenced? Second, what steps can or should society
take to protect itself from genetically identifiable potential offenders?
II. GENETICS AS A NEW DEFENSE
Assuming future acceptance by the legal system of the concept that
'" See H.J. EYSENCK, CRIME AND PERSONALITY (1964).
"s Telfer, supra note 9, at 24.
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antisocial conduct in certain individuals is at least strongly influenced
by genetic considerations, the question remains of how to deal with the
phenomenon. This question involves two further issues: Whether
genetic "aberration" is to be considered in mitigation of, or a defense to,
a criminal charge, and what type of punishment, if any, should be admin-
istered.
Addressing first the issue of genetic aberration as a complete de-
fense, the clearest application is to the defense of insanity. Society has
decided that no individual should be held accountable for acts performed
by him when he is mentally incapacitated. The application of the concept
of genetic defect to that of legal insanity, however, would appear to de-
pend upon the standard of insanity employed. The one applied in some
form today by the majority of jurisdictions is the M'Naghten rule:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong. 9
The word "disease" has been widely interpreted to include congenital
defects," and can thus be applied to such genetic abnormalities as the
XYY syndrome.
A second standard which has been recognized by a number of jurisdic-
tions is that of the Model Penal Code, also known as the "substantial
capacity" rule:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.2"
The third standard is the Durham, or "product" rule, which states
"simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect."22
The M'Naghten test clearly takes the position that insanity is a cogni-
tive rather than a behavioral disorder. The concern of the criminal
justice system is not with the defendant's ability to control his conduct,
but rather with his ability to appreciate its significance. Since having a
genetic aberration such as XYY syndrome does not seem to affect the
ability to appreciate the "nature and quality" of criminal conduct, or to
'9 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 859 (2d ed. 1969).
21 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
' Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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understand whether the conduct is right or wrong, it would appear that
the possession of an extra Y chromosome would constitute no ground
for an insanity defense.
The defense, however, could at least arguably be available under
other legal definitions of insanity. Applying the Model Penal Code, a
genetic deviant would satisfy the description of an accused who "lacks
substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law." This is similar to the "irresistible impulse" test, which is usually
defined as an impulse which the individual is unable to resist due to
mental disease or defect. Under either test, the person carrying a defec-
tive gene which can be shown to strongly inhibit his capacity to control
his antisocial acts would seem to have a complete defense.
Similarly, a genetic aberrant could be found legally "insane" by using
the Durham rule. Applying that standard, scientific evidence could be
produced to indicate that the genetically-influenced defendant's criminal
conduct was "the product of ... mental defect."
Of course, much time can be spent in argument over the exact inter-
pretation of each of these standards and their relative merits. For the
purposes of this discussion, it can readily be recognized that society's
position can be viewed as a willingness to exculpate an individual for his
antisocial conduct where, as a result of mental defect, he could not
understand the nature of his acts or of their wrongfulness, or under-
standing them, could still not control himself. In other words, we are un-
willing to punish a person for conduct which was largely the result of a
defect over which the person has little or no control.
The parallel is clear, and the policy behind the insanity defense would
seem to apply with equal validity to genetic aberration. Mental aberra-
tion caused by congenital defects is universally recognized to be within
the scope of the insanity defense. Is it a great step to include genetic
aberration within the scope assuming that such aberration resulted in
the individual being unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or
to conform his conduct to avoid that wrongfulness? In fact, is it any step
at all? Do we even need to create another category of "genetic deter-
mination" to rest alongside insanity as a complete defense? The causes
and effects of such genetic aberrations fit well within the definitions
given for insanity. The following variation of the Model Penal Code
would encompass both the genetic aberrant's conduct and the insanity
standard: A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if as a result
of genetic defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law.
Again, in assessing the suitability of an insanity-type defense to a
genetically-influenced crime, the reasons behind society providing that
defense must be analyzed and measured to fit. Quite simply, a policy
decision has been made that no individual should suffer for conduct that
is the result of a severe defect in reason or will. Assuming scientific
[Vol. 31:61
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evidence that aberrations in genetic structure can cause such a defect in
an individual's ability to perceive or control himself, it appears that the
very same policy considerations apply.
III. GENETICS AS MITIGATION
An alternative method of dealing with criminal conduct determined or
influenced by genetic factors is to consider such matters in mitigation of
the offense charged or proven. Most jurisdictions today recognize some
variation of the concept of "diminished capacity" or, as it is sometimes
known, "partial insanity." In those jurisdictions the law requires that
there be a mental disorder of such a nature as to lessen the degree of
guilt without altogether establishing innocence for mitigation to be con-
sidered. The usual example is homicide, in which the existence of such a
mental disorder can negate elements necessary to establish the offense
of murder in the first or second degrees. If, for example, the mentally
disordered individual is deemed unable to formulate willfulness,
deliberation or premeditation, the offense of first-degree murder will be
reduced to second-degree. If such an individual is not capable of freely
formulating malice, the charge may be reduced to voluntary man-
slaughter.
There is no reason why this approach could not be applied to the
genetic aberration case. The reasoning behind the "diminished capacity"
doctrine is simply an awareness that mental disease or defect is not an
all-or-nothing proposition. There is no clear separation between those
who are deemed not criminally responsible due to mental defect and
those whose defects are not quite sufficient to avoid responsibility. In
other words, there is a recognition that an individual may not be com-
pletely incapacitated by his mental problem, yet still may suffer an im-
pairment sufficient to warrant some limitation on accountability. For
this individual, society may decide to adopt a doctrine of partial respon-
sibility. This would constitute a compromise representing discomfort
with the notion of complete exoneration, yet would also evince a realiza-
tion that mental impairment should somehow lessen the harshness of
punishment.
For those who are uncomfortable with the idea of effectively granting
a license to commit crimes to those who have genetic aberrations, the
diminished capacity approach is desirable. Science may not be able to
say for some time, if ever, that a given criminal act was actually deter-
mined by the individual's genetic structure rather than merely influenced
by it, and if influenced, to what degree the conduct was influenced by
"genetic disposition." Again, we find ourselves getting into the uncom-
fortable gray areas of mental defect that have caused many courts and
legislatures to embrace the diminished capacity compromise.
Somewhat related to the question of mitigation of degree is that of
whether an individual has the ability to form a requisite specific intent.
To summarize briefly, our law requires of certain criminal offenses that
1982]
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a specific intent be shown before criminal liability attaches. Thus, for
example, the crime of burglary generally requires proof not just that
the defendant entered a structure without permission, but that he did
so with the specific intention of stealing something or committing a
felony once within that structure. An individual may be in such a mental
condition that he is capable of knowingly entering the structure, yet is
incapable of forming the plan or intent of stealing, burning, etc.,
necessary to establish the corpus of burglary. It is similarly arguable
that a genetic deviant may be capable of controlling his decision to enter
a building without permission, but be incapable of controlling a continu-
ing urge to set fire to that building once inside. In such a case, evidence
of the accused's genetic structure should be relevant to the question of
whether he was guilty of burglary (entry with intent to commit arson)
or of mere trespass.
IV. PUNISHMENT OF THE GENETIC ABERRANT
To a certain degree, word games are played in discussing what type
of crime is involved and in what degree. These games are important only in
that they lead to a given punishment or range of punishments. What
then does the criminal justice system do with an individual who has
been convicted of an offense and who has a genetic impairment?
In answering this, an initial analysis of the primary theories behind
punishment is necessary. It is generally recognized that there are four
purposes for punishing someone who has committed an antisocial act.
The first of these is simply retribution or revenge, based upon the
ancient concept of "an eye for an eye." While there is perhaps some
value to granting the victim of the antisocial conduct a degree of
satisfaction in seeing the offender punished, there are very few legal
scholars or penal experts who would accept revenge as a valid con-
sideration in determining the punishment to be meted out. In any event,
to apply the revenge theory to the genetic aberrant makes little sense.
Why exact retribution from a man because of his birth defect?
The second recognized basis for punishment is deterrence. Under this
theory we punish an offender not so much for the effect it has on him as
for the effect it will have upon others. Nothing can be done to correct
the harm that has been done by this person, but we can set an example
by punishing him and thus inhibit others from committing similar acts.
While this is generally a valid theory, the flaw when applied to the
genetic deviant is obvious: How does one deter an individual who has little
or no control over his conduct? If an individual commits an antisocial act
because of a complex interplay of biological factors beyond his
understanding or control, how would the threat of punishment have any
effect? Once we accept scientific evidence that conduct can be determined
or at least strongly influenced by a person's genetic "programming,"
deterrence as a factor in punishment ceases to exist. Of course, the ex-
tent to which an individual's conduct is influenced may well be relevant
[Vol. 31:61
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss1/6
GENETICALL Y INFL UENCED COND UCT
to the question of deterrence assuming such extent can ever be scien-
tifically or medically determined.
The third premise of punishment is rehabilitation, which is currently
the most fashionable among penal experts and sociologists. This theory
takes the approach that the offender should not be punished per se, or
at least that punishment should not be the primary objective in dealing
with the criminal offender. Rather, both society and the offender will
receive greater benefit if he is rehabilitated through counseling or
education into a more productive and cooperative member of society.
While this is a commendable goal, its application to the individual carry-
ing abnormal genes is probably pointless. Assuming that a person con-
victed of a crime committed that crime because of genetic programming,
how can he be rehabilitated? Rehabilitation proceeds on the assumption
that conduct is environmentally caused, and that attitudes and behavior
patterns which lead to criminal conduct can be modified. When the con-
duct is biologically caused, however, the theory behind rehabilitation
fails. There is, of course, the possibility that rehabilitation can expand
to include biological rehabilitation. Science may some day learn to alter
genetic structure or body chemistry in a manner sufficient to neutralize
a person's congenital genetic defects. However, this opens whole new
worlds - dark worlds - reminiscent of involuntary sterilization, prefron-
tal lobotomies and electrical and chemical shock therapy.
The fourth and final reason behind punishment is simply one of isola-
tion. The primary concern here is not for the offender, but rather for
the protection of members of society by removal of the offender from
that society either by imprisonment or by some other process such as
deportation. Imprisoning or deporting an individual because of a birth
defect goes against the grain of our sense of justice, and it would be
difficult to justify such action. Yet, the interests of society in being safe
from the future criminal acts of a genetically aberrant convicted offender
must be weighed against that offender's rights and our sense of justice.
Among the four penal theories, isolation may be the only realistic
method of dealing with the genetic deviant.
What is done with individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity?
They certainly are not returned to the streets to commit other anti-
social acts. Rather, they are committed to mental institutions for treat-
ment until they are cured. If they cannot be cured they may be institu-
tionalized for the rest of their lives. While this type of commitment may
realistically vary little from imprisonment in a penal institution, the pro-
cess is easier on society's sense of justice. Assuming that the incurably
insane will, in effect, be imprisoned for the rest of their lives because of
a medical condition not their "fault," the interests of society in being
safe from them outweighs the personal injustice.
Perhaps the foregoing is also true of the genetically impaired individ-
ual. If such a person has committed an antisocial act as a direct result of
that impairment, it would prove fruitless to seek retribution against
1982]
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him, attempt to rehabilitate him or offer him as a warning to other
genetically impaired members of the community. However, society can
protect itself by committing that individual to a facility should it appear
likely that antisocial conduct will recur.
V. PROPHYLACTIC ISOLATION OF GENETIC ABERRANTS
It has been suggested by some medical authorities that science will
someday enable us to analyze an individual's DNA or other genetic
structure and predict with considerable accuracy the likelihood of
violent or otherwise antisocial conduct in the future. We may, for example,
be able to take a blood sample from a three-year-old child and, after
analyzing it, determine that based upon extensive data from millions of
other children, there is a 92/o chance of that child growing up to become
a habitual thief, a 78/o chance that he will become a compulsive rapist,
or a 61/o chance that he will eventually take at least one human life
violently and without justification. What then should society do to pro-
tect itself from this three-year-old child?
This is not quite so improbable as might be initially believed. Certainly,
the trend of genetic research clearly points in that direction. Aided by
computerization, our increasingly efficient information-gathering
methods and statistical analysis, relatively accurate predictions of pro-
bable future criminal conduct seem not to be so farfetched.
Not so extreme is the idea of identifying and isolating individuals who
statistically can be shown to be potential threats to society, regardless
of the fact that those individuals never before committed an antisocial
act. Consider, for example, a suggestion by Professor Hyman Gross of
New York University's Law School and former Arthur Goodheart Pro-
fessor of Legal Science at Cambridge:
[T]he possibility of a radically different system deserves con-
sideration, for we might abandon much of criminal justice as we
know it now and might instead adopt procedures designed to
identify, sequester, and correct criminally dangerous persons.
Just as the automotive industry calls back for correction models
found to be defective and a danger on the road, we might re-
quire persons who have shown signs of being a threat to social
safety to submit first to diagnostic examination and then to a
regime of corrective therapy if the existence of dangerous
tendencies is confirmed.
In such a system, rules of conduct in the law would be replaced
by specifications of suspicious behavior indicating possible
dangerous tendencies .... There would no longer be room for
excuses and other claims to avoid blame that would leave
dangerous persons at large simply because they could establish
that under the circumstances it would be unjust to condemn
them.23
2 H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41-42 (1979).
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Professor Gross was not referring to genetic aberrations in this
discussion, but rather to individuals who could be identified by other
means. When compared to the potential certainty of genetic determina-
tion, these means appear relatively imprecise. The concept, however, is
there: identification of probable criminals through the application of
statistical analysis to observable data:
Though examination of personal traits will generally prove dis-
appointing, there is other information that is much more promis-
ing as a way of predicting crime and making its prevention
possible. Social statistics make it clear that often there is a
heavy concentration of crime among the part of the population
that can be identified by reference to such things as education,
race, occupational history, sex, economic status, and age. If a
target group is defined with sufficient statistical precision, an
astoundingly high proportion of its members can be expected to
commit crimes, and often just the types of crimes that concern
other members of the community most urgently."4
Of course, this all has the ominous ring of an Orwellian age and
creates a dark discomfort within most individuals. Yet, the scientific
data on genetics will be available in the near future. Once this data is
available the criminal justice system will have to deal with the problems
posed. The problem will not simply be how to deal with a defendant who
committed an offense because of his genetic makeup, but will also be
whether to seek out those with "dangerous" genes and forcefully isolate
those individuals from society. It will be difficult to ignore the fact that
society now has the ability to identify many of those who will kill, maim
or rape. Faced with the prospect of saving innocent future victims, how
heavily will the "rights" of a genetic aberrant weigh?
The social cost of such a decision would be great. As Professor Gross
recognized concerning his own theory of preventive isolation/treatment,
[t]hough such a program for control of dangerous persons would
be based on a rational assessment of dangerousness, it would
shock the conscience of a society committed to egalitarian ideals
and to rights of self-determination. Citizens would be deprived
of their liberty because of their statistical misfortunes. And
even though a person chooses, despite the disadvantages of his
background and present circumstances, to live a life no less law-
abiding than his statistically fortunate neighbor, under this pro-
gram of crime control he would not be allowed the opportunities
that normally attend such a choice.25
Obviously, it is unjust to punish someone for being genetically dif-
ferent, just as it would be wrong to punish a person for being mentally
214 Id. at 43.
' Id at 43-44.
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ill. But this is no answer, for we do "punish" the mentally ill. Futher-
more we punish them long before they have committed any criminal
acts. Our society has already weighed the countervailing considerations
involved and determined that a person who is found to be dangerous
because of a mental abnormality may be committed to an institution
through noncriminal procedures. Most such cases in our society today
involve persons who have committed antisocial or even dangerous acts,
but the fact remains that we have already weighed the factors and made
a collective decision that it is the dangerousness of the mental aberrant
and not the existence of any criminality in his conduct that justifies tak-
ing away his freedom.
The concept has thus already been adopted; it only awaits application
to the genetically impaired. The difficult decisions, however, do not end
there. Once science has opened Pandora's box for the law, dilemmas
abound. For example, just how far are we to go in identifying in-
dividuals with deviant genes? Certainly, science presently has the
capability through the process of "karyotyping" for testing an in-
dividual and determining whether his genetic structure contains a flaw.
Is everyone to submit to genetic testing, much as is now done in
registering for the draft?
Obviously, there are difficult moral questions to be considered in
facing such decisions. The Nuremburg Code, for example, specifically
outlaws any genetic screening programs in the absence of the subject's
informed consent. Yet what is ethical in this context? Ethics tend to be
relative to the current needs of society:
It seems to us that the authority for ethical decisions comes
from man himself, from his own choices, individually and in
groups. The great numbers and heterogeneity of mankind make
it likely that new possibilities will be tried out by some people,
no matter now [sic] they stand with respect to civil, moral or
sacred law. Submission to the test of public opinion and practice
is sometimes a slow method of change. The touchstone of man's
choices seems to be, "whether it is right and good for man?""6
Of course, genetic screening as a concept is not new. Such procedures
are currently used by the medical profession to detect carriers of such
genetically-carried defects as Tay-Sachs disease and sickle cell anemia.
Again, the concept itself has been embraced, only the application is in
question.
Perhaps more serious problems than whether individuals should be
genetically screened are posed when we try to decide when in an in-
dividual's life he or she is to be tested for genetic aberration. Should
children be subjected to such tests? If a six-year-old child is found to
2' Arnold & Moseley, Ethical Issues Arising from Human Genetics, 2 J.
MEDICAL ETHICS 12 (1976).
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carry a dangerous genetic characteristic, is he to be taken away im-
mediately and committed? Or is the child to be permitted to stay with
his parents until the age of, say, sixteen, always with the sword of
Damocles hanging over the family's head? Do we go further back and
test newborn babies, requiring by law that the infants not be permitted
to live -much as is done in more primitive cultures with babies display-
ing such defects as Down's Syndrome or malformed limbs?
Will we go even further back and test the unborn fetus in every
pregnancy? If the fetus is found to have "bad" genes, are we to require
an abortion by law? Again, science has already thoughtfully provided us
with the process of "amniocentesis" with which to perform this odious
task. Of course, yet another balancing of the relative interests of society
and the individual must be conducted. Amniocentesis involves a very
definite risk to the embryo, and in the process of attempting to detect a
defective embryo a perfectly normal one may be damaged or even killed.
Or will we go all the way back-and order sterilization of all persons
genetically capable of transmitting aberrant genes to offspring?
VI. CONCLUSION
The trend of current genetic research is clear. Assuming the legal
system is eventually presented with the scientific capability of
"reading" DNA and the statistical ability of predicting with substantial
accuracy the probable future consequences of aberrant genetic struc-
ture, some very difficult questions will be posed. How should the
criminal justice system deal with a criminal offender whose conduct was
caused by a genetic aberration? Does society have the right to seek out
such individuals before they cause harm and remove them from the com-
munity?
As always, it will be up to our legal system to attempt to integrate ad-
vances made possible by science at the least cost to human liberty.
Society will simply not ignore the reality of being able to predict and
thereby prevent harm to its innocent members. The decisions cannot,
therefore, be avoided in the long run.
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